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Introduction*
With the promulgation of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective July 1, 1975,1 this state became one of the
first to have adopted both a modern code of criminal procedure
and a modern code of substantive criminal law.2 Pursuant to
a 1971 statute authorizing it to promulgate rules of criminal pro-
cedure with the assistance of an advisory committee,3 the Su-
* The Board of Editors wishes to express its appreciation to Bruce
D. Johnson, a third-year staff member, for his help in preparing this sec-
tion on the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.
1. In re Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, Order of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, 299 Minn. (unnumbered page) (1974).
2. The substantive criminal law of Minnesota is codified at Mnu-
NESOTA STATuTEs ch. 609. For a recent survey of developments in state
criminal procedure codes, see Am, Implementation of the ABA Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice: A Progress Report, 12 AM. CRm. L. Rnv.
477 (1975).
3. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 250, §§ 1-8 (codified at MmN. STAT. §
480.059 (1974)), provides in part:
Subd. 1. Rules and regulations. The Supreme Court
shall have the power to regulate the pleadings, practice, pro-
cedure, and the form thereof in criminal actions in all courts
of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to time. Such
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preme Court of Minnesota appointed a committee4 that spent
nearly four years preparing draft proposals. Owing to the dis-
organized state of existing provisions for criminal procedure, the
task of the advisory committee was a difficult one.5 Some exist-
ing provisions had been written piecemeal, 6 and some had been
modified by decisions of the United States and Minnesota
supreme courts.7 Besides complicating criminal practice, this
patchwork of statutes and case law failed to reflect new concepts
in criminal procedure successfully implemented in other jurisdic-
tions.8
In drafting the new rules, the advisory committee relied pri-
marily on existing Minnesota statutory law, state and federal
rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights
of any person.
Subd. 2. Advisory Committee. Before any such rules are
adopted the Supreme Court shall appoint an advisory committee
consisting of eight lawyers licensed to practice law in the state
and at least two judges of the district court and one judge of a
court exercising municipal court jurisdiction to assist the court
in considering and preparing such rules.
4. The members of the advisory committee are: Frank Clay-
bourne, Chairman, Judge Charles E. Cashman, Henry H. Feikema, Pro-
fessor David Graven, Judge Charles C. Johnson, C. Paul Jones, John E.
MacGibbon, Henry W. McCarr, Jr., Ronald L Meshbesher, Judge Donald
C. Odden, Judge Chester G. Rosengren, and Judge Bruce C. Stone. Pro-
fessor William B. Danforth served as reporter, Professor Maynard E. Pir-
sig served as consultant, and Justice Ge)rge M. Scott served as supreme
court coordinator.
5. A 1974 amendment to the enabling act provided that the new
rules would supersede conflicting statutes. MNN. STAT. § 480.059(7)
(1974).
6. For example, lnmsoTA STA'ruEs §§ 357.32, 388.05, 597.11,
611.06, and ch. 596 are all superseded to the extent inconsistent, by rule
22, dealing with subpoenas.
7. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (use of de-
fendant's inadmissible pretrial statements for credibility impeachment
allowed); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (subsequent
use at trial of defendant's testimony at "suppression" hearing disal-
lowed); State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967) (prose-
cutorial use at trial of evidence of similar illegal actions in the past al-
lowed); State v. Grunau, 273 Minn. 315, 141 N.W.2d 815 (1966) (produc-
tion by the police of some types of evidence and statements by witnesses
for impeachment use by the defense required); State v. Thompson, 273
Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966) (defense inspection of unprivileged pre-
trial statements of witnesses once they have testified allowed, applying
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (.957)); State ex rel. Rasmussen
v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1965) (evidentiary hearing on
motions to suppress evidence gathered by the prosecution required);
State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965) (provision of
prior written notice to defendant of his past crimes required).
8. See ABA STAxDARDs RELATING TO DiscovERY AND PROCEDURE BE-




constitutional law, the American Bar Association (ABA) Mini-
mum Standards of Criminal Justice Project,9 and numerous
other existing and proposed rules of criminal procedure. Minne-
sota statutory law guided the advisory committee in formulating
procedures respecting the raising of an alibi' 0 and the insanity
defense."' Other Minnesota statutes, however, failed to utilize
new constitutional interpretations, such as those concerning dis-
covery,12 and were replaced. In all, 157 statutory provisions
were entirely, and 63 partially, superseded by the new rules.'3
As a result, the new rules bear little resemblance to their prede-
cessors.
The advisory committee also codified recent decisions of the
United States and Minnesota supreme courts' 4 mandating pro-
cedures not reflected in the statutes. Examples of important
case-law developments requiring incorporation in the new rules
were requirements for prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory
evidence' 5 and hearings to determine whether the prosecution
has obtained its evidence in a manner violative of the defendant's
constitutional rights.16
The advisory committee relied heavily in the drafting process
on the American Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Crim-
inal Justice Project. The ABA Project, like the Minnesota ad-
visory committee, set out to adopt the best procedures from all
jurisdictions and to make its own suggestions for new procedures
9. For a history of the ABA Project, see Jameson, Background and
Development of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 Am. CRnm.
L. REv. 255 (1974). See generally Symposium, The American Bar Asso-
ciation Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 12
Am. Cumw. L. REv. 251 (1974).
10. The previous statutory provision, Mrn. STAT. § 630.14 (1974),
has been incorporated and expanded in rule 9. MrVx. R. Csim. P.
9.02(1) (3) (a).
11. See, e.g., MmNN. STAT. § 611.026 (1974) (defining competency to
proceed at trial and sentencing, which is substantially incorporated in
rule 20.01(1)).
12. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court
upheld a Florida statute requiring pretrial production by the defense of
the names of prospective alibi witnesses. The Minnesota statute, Minn.
Laws 1935, ch. 194, § 3 (codified at Mm. STAT. § 630.14 (1974)), pro-
vided only for notice of the substance of an alibL
13. MnESOTA RuLEs OF CouRT ii-viii (1975).
14. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
15. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See generally
Allyn, Pretrial Discovery in Minnesota, 60 MN. L. REV. 725 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3
(1965). See generally Comment, The Pretrial Probable Cause Hearing
in Minnesota, 60 Iu. L. REV. 773 (1976).
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to improve the functioning of the criminal process. 17 To date,
approximately 22 states have adopted much of the ABA Stand-
ards,' 8 while most of the remaining states have undertaken
studies comparing the ABA Standards with their own law.19
The Minnesota advisory committee undertook its comparative
study in 1971 and completed it before drafting the proposed
rules.20 That the new rules implement a major portion of the
ABA Standards 21 is evident from their structure,22 the word-
ing and substance of many of their provisions,23 and the advisory
committee comments. 24
A number of other proposed and effective rules of criminal
procedure aided the advisory committee in drafting the rules,
including the Revised Uniform Code of Criminal Procedure,
written by the National Association of Uniform Law Commis-
sioners,25 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 28 to-
gether with the proposed amendments thereto.2 7 These amend-
17. The stated purpose of the ABA Project was "to compile and
formulate standards which [could] be recommended as a desirable mini-
mum to be applied to the administration of criminal justice in all of the
50 states" and, when appropriate, throughout the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral government. Office of the Criminal Justice Project, Institute of Ju-
dicial Administration, American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Apri[ 22, 1966. The underlying ob-jectives were to promote effective law enforcement and adequate protec-
tion of the public and to safeguard and amplify the constitutional rights
of those suspected of crime. Id.
18. The following states have implemented or are in the process of
implementing sections of the ABA Standards: Alabama, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Me.dco, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin. Arn, supra note 2, at 479-82.
19. Id. at 479 nn.5 & 6.
20. See Scott, An Overview of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 60 MIN. L. REv. 717 (1976).
21. See Am, supra note 2, at 480.
22. Compare, e.g., ABA STANDARnS, supra note 8, §§ 2.1, 3.1 with
MINm. R. Cmv. P. 9.01, 9.02.
23. Compare, e.g., ABA STANDARDs, supra note 8, § 4.1 with Minn.
R. Crim. P. 9.03 (1).
24. See, e.g., Mmii. R. Cnm. P. 9, Comment.
25. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CO IKISSIONERS ON UNIFORMI STATE
LAws, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COi\nVrSSIONERS ON
UNIroRm STATE LAws, UNIFORM Rui.s OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 411(1974). The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure have been submitted
to the American Bar Association for approval. See Pirsig & Kirwin, The
N.C.C.U.S.L.'s New Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 61 A.B.A.J. 843(1975).
26. See FED. R. CRnw. P. 9.01 (3) (1) (b), Comments.
27. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Fed. R.
[Vol. 60:711
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ments, for example, guided the committee in interpreting court
decisions concerning pretrial discovery and the duty of the pros-
ecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant.28
Statutes, practices, and proposals from other states, such as
those governing the procedure by which an insanity defense is
raised, furnished additional assistance.29
Drawing on these various sources, the advisory committee
drafted procedures designed to provide effective law enforcement
while preserving the constitutional rights of the accused. Quite
naturally, the new rules reflect current attitudes toward appre-
hension, trial, and rehabilitation of criminals, but, at the same
time, they remain largely faithful to past practices of criminal
justice administration.
Perhaps the greatest potential for significant departures
from previous Minnesota statutory and common-law procedures
lies in the power of the courts to interpret the rules as either
conferring new rights on the accused or denying rights the
draftsmen intended to preserve. Although mandated by the leg-
islature to regulate criminal pleadings, practice, and procedure,
the supreme court is specifically prohibited from abridging, en-
larging, or modifying the substantive rights of any person,3 0 and
the legislature has reserved the right to modify or repeal any
rule adopted by the supreme court.3 1 Thus, both the judicial
interpretation and the language of the rules must be reviewed
for consistency with the legislative mandate as well as with the
state and federal constitutions. 2
The collection of Articles, Notes, and Comments that follow
provides a critical analysis of certain features of the new Min-
Crim. P. 16 (a), 48 F.R.D. 553, 587-91 (1970) (discovery of the prosecu-
tion's trial witnesses, their written or recorded statements or summaries
of their oral statements, and their criminal records).
28. See Mxnw. R. CRnv. P. 9.01 (1), Comments.
29. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. §§ 971.17, .175 (1969). See also State v.
Raskin, 34 Wis. 2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967).
30. MVN. STAT. § 480.059(1) (1974).
31. Id. § 480.059 (8).
32. For example, the Minnesota supreme court in State v. Florence,
239 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1976), narrowly interpreted rule 11.03, which
provides for a determination of probable cause prior to binding a
defendant over for public trial. Despite explicit language requiring the
prosecutor to prove probable cause with evidence that would be admis-
sible at trial and guaranteeing the defendant the right to cross-examina-
tion, the court construed this rule as benefiting only defendants produc-
ing witnesses who, if believed, would exonerate them. See Comment,




nesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Its purpose is to call to the
attention of the supreme court and the legislature problems that
may arise under certain applications of the rules, and arguments
in support of and in opposition to the wisdom and constitution-
ality of those applications. Following an overview of the rules
by Justice Scott of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is an article
by Richard Allyn, the Solicitor General of Minnesota, which dis-
cusses and ultimately defends the constitutionality of the provi-
sions allowing pretrial prosecutorial discovery. His views are
answered by a student Note, which concludes that certain fore-
seeable applications of the prosecutorial discovery rules will vio-
late the self-incrimination and due process clauses. That ex-
change is followed by two student Comments. The first criticizes
a recent Minnesota decision that suggests that the court might
interpret rule 26, pertaining to waiver by a defendant of his
right to jury trial, to vest the triEd court with broad discretion
to deny a motion for waiver when the judge views a jury trial
as in the defendant's best interests. The second criticizes a recent
decision of the Minnesota supreme court holding that where a
defendant fails at the omnibus hearing provided by rule 11 to
produce witnesses whose testimony would, if believed, exonerate
him, the court may find probable cause to bind the defendant
over without conducting an adversary proceeding. It is to be
hoped that this commentary will provide a useful perspective
for the court and the advisory committee when they review the
first year of operation of the rules. 33
33. In ordering the adoption of the rules, the supreme court also
provided, "The Advisory Committee will continue to serve to moni-
tor said Rules and to accept comments for suggested changes. A hearing
shall be held by the court after one year of operation of these Rules."
In re Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, Order of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, 299 Minn. (unnumbered page) (1974).
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